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INTRODUCTION 
In its landmark ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges1, the Supreme 
Court held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the fundamental right of same-sex 
couples to marry.2 Beyond its immediate ramifications, the Court’s 
                                                     
 1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2604-05 (“The Court now holds that same-sex couples may 
exercise the fundamental right to marry.”). 
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decision left a number of important questions unanswered.3 These 
questions center on the consequences that should ensue for those 
holding fast to beliefs contrary to those espoused in Obergefell.4  
Most of the resistance to Obergefell has originated from 
religious objections.5 Some commentators have responded to this 
resistance by calling for the revocation of the tax-exempt status of 
organizations that continue to advocate against same-sex marriage.6 
                                                     
 3. See id. at 2622 (“One immediate question invited by the majority’s 
position is whether States may retain the definition of marriage as a union of two 
people.”); see also id. at 2625 (“Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise 
religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex 
marriage . . . .”). 
 4. See Dennis Romboy, A Look at the “12 Religious Freedom Grenades” 
Launched by the Supreme Court Decision On Marriage, DESERET NEWS (Jul. 7, 
2015), http://national.deseretnews.com/article/5096/a-look-at-the-12-religious-
freedom-grenades8217-launched-by-the-supreme-court-decision-on-marriage.html. 
The majority and dissent themselves were at odds over the ramifications of 
Obergefell. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606-07 (majority opinion) (“[I]t 
must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may 
continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-
sex marriage should not be condoned.”), with id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“I assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts 
in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk 
being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and 
schools.”). 
 5. See Elisha Fieldstadt, Supreme Court’s Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage 
Met With Resistance in Some States, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2015, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/supreme-courts-ruling-same-sex-marriage-
met-resistance-n382751; Eliott McLaughlin, Despite Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, 
Spasms of Resistance Persist, CNN (June 30, 2015, 10:06 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/us/same-sex-marriage-supreme-court-ruling-
holdouts/.   
 6. See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Does Your Church Ban Gay Marriage? Then It 
Should Start Paying Taxes, FUSION, (June 29, 2015), 
http://fusion.net/story/158096/does-your-church-ban-gay-marriage-then-it-should-
start-paying-taxes/; Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time to End Tax Exemptions for 
Religious Institutions, TIME (June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-
time-to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/; Eugene Volokh, Religious 
Exemptions–A Guide for the Confused, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/religious-
exemptions-a-guide-for-the-confused/. Additionally, real-life examples illustrate that 
religious organizations could indeed lose their tax-exempt status over the same-sex 
marriage issue. For example, in New Jersey, a Christian ministry lost its tax-exempt 
status after refusing to provide their facilities for use to a lesbian couple for their 
civil union ceremony. Thomas M. Messner, Same-Sex Marriage and the Threat to 
Religious Liberty, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (October 30, 2008), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/10/Same-Sex-Marriage-and-the-
Threat-to-Religious-Liberty#_ftnref37.    
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Conversely, those objecting to Obergefell have been relegated to 
defending these organizations’ tax-exempt status.7 
While Obergefell lent new ammunition and context to the 
debate surrounding religious organizations and same-sex marriage, 
scholars on both sides of the issue had already grappled with this 
debate’s contours.8 Prior to Obergefell, this debate mostly addressed 
hypotheticals, considering that there was no national consensus on 
whether a right to same-sex marriage existed.9 However, post-
Obergefell, the federal government now indirectly supports religious 
organizations through grants of tax-exempt status10 even though 
many of these organizations advance a cause at odds with 
Obergefell’s holding.11  
Current federal income-tax law does not expressly prohibit 
discrimination by religious organizations.12 The crux of the issue 
involves the interpretation of the public policy doctrine articulated by 
                                                     
 7. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he tax 
exemptions of some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed 
same-sex marriage. . . . Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the 
treatment they receive from the majority today.”); David Lauter, Will a Religious 
Institution Lose Its Tax-Exempt Status for Refusing to Marry a Same-Sex Couple?, 
L.A. TIMES, (Jun. 26, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-tax-
exemptions-religious-20150626-story.htm; Denny Burk, Ending Tax Exemptions 
Means Ending Churches, THE FEDERALIST, (June 29, 2015), 
http://thefederalist.com/2015/06/29/ending-tax-exemptions-means-ending-churches/. 
During oral arguments, Justice Alito wondered whether, under Bob Jones, schools 
would still be able to oppose same-sex marriage without risking their tax-exempt 
status. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571, 14–574). Solicitor General Verrilli replied that it 
was “certainly going to be an issue.” Id.  
 8. See Austin Caster, “Charitable” Discrimination: Why Taxpayers 
Should Not Have to Fund 501(C)(3) Organizations that Discriminate Against LGBT 
Employees, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 403, 403 (2011-2012); Douglas Nejaime, 
Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the 
Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1169 
(2012); Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 
501(C)(3) Exemption of Religious Organizations that Discriminate, 17 WM & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 715, 715 (2009); Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt 
from Civil Rights Laws?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 781, 781 (2007).  
 9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 10. See Mirkay, supra note 8, at 715-717.   
 11. 135 S. Ct. at 2599.  
 12. See Nicholas Mirkay, Is It “Charitable” to Discriminate? The 
Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) in the Gold Standard for Charities, 
2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 51 (discussing the meaning of “charitable” under § 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code).  
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the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States,13 which 
held that the Treasury Department (and by delegation, the Internal 
Revenue Service) may revoke the tax-exempt status of organizations 
whose actions violated “established public policy.”14 The question is 
therefore whether religious organizations15 that advocate and act on 
beliefs arguably contrary to Obergefell violate public policy such 
that the Treasury Department and the IRS could revoke the tax-
exempt status of these organizations.16 This question is especially 
pressing given the Bob Jones Court’s failure to delineate the 
contours of the public-policy doctrine and the Obergefell Court’s 
decision to leave this question unanswered.  
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should clarify the 
scope of the public policy doctrine established in Bob Jones by 
holding that fundamental public policy arises only in the context of a 
decades-long, concerted effort by all three branches of government 
to address an issue. This is supported by the disharmonious positions 
among the three branches of government on same-sex rights, the 
language and problem addressed in Bob Jones, and the historical 
justification for tax exemptions. The logical corollary of this 
argument is that Obergefell’s recognition of a fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage does not establish fundamental public policy 
granting the IRS power to revoke the tax-exempt status of religious 
organizations that oppose same-sex marriage.17 
                                                     
 13. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 14. Id. at 586.  
 15. Although this Note discusses religious organizations generally, it should 
be pointed out that churches, while technically a religious organization, are held to 
an entirely different standard for purposes of the federal tax code. Churches are 
exempt from the requirement of applying for tax-exempt status; they gain their tax 
exemptions automatically. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A). 
 16. Only the Internal Revenue Service can challenge an organization’s tax-
exempt status; third parties are unable to sue the IRS regarding tax-exempt status 
determinations. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 17. This Note does not argue that religious organizations have a 
constitutional right to tax exemption, but only that the public policy doctrine does 
not provide the IRS with the constitutional authority to revoke the tax exemption of 
religious organizations that oppose same-sex marriage. It is clear that religious 
organizations and even churches can constitutionally lose their tax-exempt status for 
other reasons. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California, 
493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). Additionally, this Note does not address other possible roadblocks 
attendant to revoking the tax-exempt status of religious organizations that oppose 
same-sex marriage, including issues of standing, administrative discretion, statutory 
restrictions such as federal and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, and 
constitutional hurdles such as the Establishment Clause. 
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Part I of this Note discusses the religious nature of marriage, 
explaining why religious institutions in particular hold strong views 
on the issue of same-sex marriage that are in tension with 
Obergefell.18 Part II provides an overview of the tax-exemption 
process and the statutory and regulatory standards that an 
organization must satisfy in order to obtain tax-exempt status.19 Part 
III discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 501(c)(3), 
focusing specifically on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Walz v. 
Tax Commission of the City of New York20 and Bob Jones.21 Part IV 
analyzes the public policy doctrine in the context of same-sex rights, 
concluding that the Supreme Court, in the wake of Obergefell, 
should adopt a narrow interpretation of the public policy doctrine, 
holding the doctrine inapplicable to religious organizations that 
oppose same-sex marriage.22 
I. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND MARRIAGE 
The definition of marriage is of particular importance to many 
religions because of the theological significance that the institution 
of marriage carries. For many religions, marriage is not merely a 
social institution, but a religious concept in and of itself and a core 
tenet of the belief system.23 Thus, for many religious institutions, the 
defense of the traditional definition of marriage is a religious mission 
of the highest order.24  
The largest religious institutions in the United States today all 
define marriage as a religious concept and a core tenet of their belief 
                                                     
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).  
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. Joel A. Nichols, Misunderstanding Marriage and Missing Religion, 
2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 195, 202 (“Omitting any discussion of religion [in 
discussing marriage] is surely a conceptual mistake, for every major religion has a 
well-developed theology of marriage, an attendant set of procedures and processes 
to facilitate the same, and both historical and present normative claims upon its 
believers about marriage.”). 
 24. Throughout history, Christians have always adhered to the traditional 
definition of marriage against competing secular definitions. As such, when Roman 
law prohibited slaves from marrying except in cases of concubinage, Christian 
bishops opposed this practice by allowing slaves to conduct secret marriage 
ceremonies in churches.  See Rosemary Haughton, No. 23: The Theology of 
Marriage 41 (Edward Yarnold ed., 1971). 
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system. In the Roman Catholic Church,25 for example, marriage is 
not only a religious concept, but one of the seven recognized 
sacraments.26 And for Catholics, sacraments are divine in origin and 
are the primary means through which believers strengthen their faith 
and partake in spiritual growth.27  
For most Protestant traditions, marriage is not considered a 
sacrament, but is viewed as a distinct religious covenant between 
God and the believers.28 The Christian view on marriage is more than 
simply a particular view on sexual ethics; it derives its importance 
from its divine origins in the creation of the human order.29 For many 
Protestants, marriage is not only God’s view on the proper 
relationship between men and women, but an expression of a 
restored humanity in the image of God, which is not complete until 
the union between a man and a woman is achieved.30 For many 
Christians, marriage is also a symbol of God’s unbreakable covenant 
with believers and his love for them.31 Further, marriage is the ideal 
environment for human reproduction, a context where husband and 
wife reflect God’s image through the act of creating a child.32 From 
there, the familial environment is the central place for the inculcation 
of the Christian faith to children.33 
                                                     
 25. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest single religious denomination 
in the United States. See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, Columnists Say It . . . , First 
Things, (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2005/11/rjn-11205-
columnists-say-it (specifying that the Roman Catholic Church’s 66 million members 
make it the largest religious denomination in the United States). 
 26. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1210 (2d ed. 1997). 
 27. Id. § 1131. 
 28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. BROUWER, BEYOND “I DO”: WHAT CHRISTIANS 
BELIEVE ABOUT MARRIAGE 21-23 (2001) (defining a “covenant” as an unbreakable, 
enduring bond between members). 
 29. HENRY A. BOWMAN, A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF MARRIAGE 19 
(1959).  
 30. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, A THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE 14-15 (1967) 
(“Man, complete and whole, is not created until male and female come together in a 
union of one flesh which makes them a whole being . . . . [A person] makes himself 
fully human by finding in his spouse the remedy for his own inadequacies as a male 
or female.”). 
 31. MATTHIAS J. SCHEEBEN, MYSTERIES OF CHRISTIANITY 601-02 (1946). 
 32. See Bowman, supra note 29, at 22. 
 33. See Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Gravissimum Educationis 
[Declaration on Christian Education] art. 3 (1965), http:// 
www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm (emphasizing 
that it is “particularly in the Christian family, enriched by the grace and the office of 
the sacrament of matrimony, that children should be taught from their early years to 
8   [Vol:St.Pg] 
For the dominant religious traditions across the United States, 
marriage is a predominantly religious concept accorded high 
importance.34 This explains not only why religious institutions have 
been at the forefront in defending the traditional definition of 
marriage,35 but also why many of these institutions continue to resist 
the Obergefell Court’s definition of marriage. Because of this, the 
beliefs of these institutions will run counter to the public policy 
dictated by government bodies.36 Inevitably, one point of conflict 
will occur at the intersection of religious institutions and the 
government, in the tax arena. 
II. THE TAX EXEMPTION STATUTE: AN OVERVIEW 
Tax-exempt status is crucial to the ability of religious 
organizations to engage in charitable work because of the benefits it 
provides. This is supported by the scope of charitable giving in the 
United States. In 2011, charitable giving in the United States 
amounted to $174.5 billion, with an average charitable deduction per 
return of $1,201.37 Forty-five percent of American households that 
gave to charitable causes directed this giving to religious 
organizations.38 The average donation to religious organizations for 
that year was $1,703.39 
The tax-exempt status of religious organizations is deeply 
rooted in America’s history and traditions. In 1798, Congress for the 
first time recognized state-conferred exemptions of churches from 
real estate and certain other taxes.40 Legislation enacted in the wake 
of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment expressly provided 
that religious organizations would be exempt from federal income 
taxes.41 Since 1894, individual contributions made to organizations 
that operate exclusively for religious purposes are also eligible for a 
                                                                                                                
have a knowledge of God according to the faith received in Baptism, to worship 
Him, and to love their neighbor”). 
 34. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
 35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
 37. Charitable Giving in America: Some Facts and Figures, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHARITABLE STAT. (2011), http://nccs.urban.org/nccs/statistics/Charitable-
Giving-in-America-Some-Facts-and-Figures.cfm. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. at 677-78 & n.5 (1970).  
 41. Id. at 676 n.4. 
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deduction.42 Subsequent federal income tax legislation incorporated 
similar provisions.43 This policy of exempting religious organizations 
has continued to the present.44 
Title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code governs tax exemptions. 
Section 501 details the requirements that an organization must meet 
to qualify as exempt from federal income entity taxation. Section 170 
specifies which taxpayer contributions to section 501 organizations 
receive preferential treatment. 
Section 501 enumerates eight categories of organizations that 
are presumptively exempt from taxation unless sections 502 or 503 
deny such exemption.45 One category includes organizations 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, 
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . 
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”46 An 
organization is “organized and operated” for one or more of these 
purposes if it demonstrates that both its organization (organizational 
test) and operation (operational test) qualify it as an exempted 
entity.47 The organizational test is met if the organization’s founding 
documents limit it to exempt purposes.48 Conversely, the operational 
test is met if the organization shows that its operation substantially 
revolves around achieving the tax-exempt purposes for which it was 
organized.49 
Although section 501(c)(3) requires that an organization’s 
purpose be limited to those delineated in the statute, an organization 
may still engage in incidental, non-exempt activities without 
violating the Code.50 However, if any of the non-exempt purposes are 
substantial in nature, the organization’s tax-exempt status is 
                                                     
 42. Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). 
 43. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913); Revenue Act of 1916, 
ch. 463, § 11(a)(6), 39 Stat. 756, 766 (1916); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 231(6), 
40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (1918). 
 44. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 330, 431 (2d ed. 2000). 
 45. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2015). Sections 502 and 503 exclude “feeder 
organizations,” such as self-dealing organizations. Id. §§ 502-03. 
 46. Id. § 501(c)(3). 
 47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2002). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Church of Chosen People v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 
(D. Minn. 1982) (“Courts have . . . interpreted the word ‘exclusively’ to mean 
‘substantially.’”). 
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extinguished.51 This is the case even if the organization also engages 
in a number of exempt purposes.52 
Section 170 governs contributions to organizations that may 
qualify for a deduction under the Code. To qualify as a “charitable 
contribution” under section 107, the contribution must be a 
“contribution or gift to or for the use of” a government unit, a 
501(c)(3) organization, a veteran’s aid group, fraternal society, or 
non-profit cemetery company.53 Further, the contribution must meet 
several timing requirements, and the percentage of income that an 
individual may deduct per year is limited.54 Generally, individuals 
may deduct donations to 501(c)(3) organizations of up to one-half of 
their adjusted gross income.55 
Federal tax-exempt status provides a myriad of other benefits. 
First, all income generated by 501(c)(3) organizations that is related 
to the exempt purposes of the organization is exempt from taxes.56 
Second, federal tax-exempt status further promotes contributions by 
donors, who receive a deduction for their donations.57 Third, federal 
tax-exempt status often also exempts 501(c)(3) organizations from 
property taxation by a state.58 Additionally, organizations that qualify 
for 501(c)(3) status are exempt from federal unemployment taxes.59 
Although it is relatively easy for an organization to qualify for 
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3), an organization’s activity 
is restricted in numerous ways once the status is conferred. For 
example, members of 501(c)(3) organizations may not benefit in 
their individual capacity from the organization’s activities or 
property.60 Exempt organizations are also prohibited from attempting 
                                                     
 51. See Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).  
 52. See id. 
 53. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2015).  
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. § 170(b)(1)(A). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally id. § 170. 
 58. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 42-11109, -11114-16, -11120-21 (2016) 
(exempting 501(c)(3) organizations from property taxes); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 
214 (Deering 2016) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(7), (75) (2015); D.C. Code. 
Ann. § 47-1010.01 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
79-201 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 652 (West 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 205.94 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 272.02 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-31-1 (2016); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.65 (West 2015). 
 59. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8) (2015). 
 60. See id. § 501(c)(3) (authorizing exemption only if “no part of the net 
earnings of [the organization] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual”). 
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to influence, promote, or oppose pending legislation61 or to 
participate overtly in election campaigns of political candidates.62 
Additionally, in 1977, the IRS required that exempt organizations 
must exhibit a sincere belief in their doctrines.63 
The statutory restrictions imposed on exempt organizations, 
however, are not the only limitations on the activities of these 
institutions. Arguably, the Supreme Court imposed the most 
controversial restriction on these organizations’ activity, which is 
discussed in Part III below. 
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 501(c)(3) has 
been guided by two seminal cases: Walz v. Tax Commission of New 
York64 and Bob Jones University v. United States.65 First, in Walz, the 
Court examined whether a state property-tax exemption of churches 
violated the Establishment Clause. In so doing, the Court discussed 
what it considered to be the primary justifications for government’s 
tax exemption of religious organizations. Second, in Bob Jones, the 
Court enunciated the public policy restriction on tax exemption of 
religious organizations.66  
A. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York 
In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, the Supreme Court 
upheld New York’s grant of a statutory property-tax exemption to 
religious organizations.67 First, the Court considered the justifications 
for a state’s decision to grant tax exemptions to religious 
                                                     
 61. See Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 
849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that nonprofit religious organization’s support of 
restoration of prayer in public schools violated requirements for tax-exempt status). 
 62. See § 501(c)(3) (prohibiting tax exempt organizations from 
“participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office”). 
 63. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 44, at 441 (quoting I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 36,996 (Feb. 3, 1977)). The government, however, bears the ultimate 
burden of persuasion in proving a lack of sincere beliefs on the part of the 
organization at issue. See id. Additionally, the government may only question the 
organization’s sincerity of belief if the organization fails to provide any evidence of 
its genuineness. See id. 
 64. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 65. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Walz, 397 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
12   [Vol:St.Pg] 
organizations.68 Although it recognized the valuable social benefits 
generated by the work of religious organizations,69 the Court held 
that the provision of social benefits alone is an insufficient 
justification for tax exemption because of the variety, nature, and 
scope of social services that religious organizations provide.70 Rather, 
the Court reasoned that tax exemptions for religious organizations 
are justified based on the pluralism and diversity that religious 
organizations offer to American society.71 Further, the Court found 
that the history and tradition of the receipt of tax exemptions by 
religious organizations was a powerful justification for continued 
receipt of those benefits.72 
B. Bob Jones University v. United States 
The public-policy doctrine originated in Bob Jones. To 
understand the Court’s holding in that case, however, it is important 
to realize the context of the Court’s decision. Bob Jones dealt with 
racial discrimination in education. The Supreme Court’s holding in 
that case, however, reflected a long history of executive, legislative, 
and judicial efforts to address this issue. Therefore, the Bob Jones 
                                                     
 68. Id. at 673 (majority opinion). 
 69. It is undisputed that many religious organizations contribute 
substantially to charity. Catholic charities are “the largest provider of social services 
after the federal government.” Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y, 206, 224 
(2010). 
 70. Walz, 397 U.S. at 673 (“We find it unnecessary to justify the tax 
exemption on the social welfare services or “good works” that some churches 
perform for parishioners and others . . . . Churches vary substantially in the scope of 
such services; programs expand or contract according to resources and need . . . . 
The extent of social services may vary, depending on whether the church serves an 
urban or rural, a rich or poor constituency. To give emphasis to so variable an aspect 
of the work of religious bodies would introduce an element of governmental 
evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs, thus 
producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of 
neutrality seeks to minimize. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as a 
significant element to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to 
confrontations that could escalate to constitutional dimensions.”). 
 71. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[G]overnment grants exemptions 
to religious organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of 
American society by their religious activities.”).  
 72. Id. at 681 (“History is particularly compelling in the present case 
because of the undeviating acceptance given religious tax exemptions from our 
earliest days as a Nation.”). 
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holding must be viewed through the lens of the history that preceded 
it. 
1. Racial Discrimination in Education Prior to Bob Jones 
After the Supreme Court held the “separate but equal” doctrine 
unconstitutional in 1954,73 many white parents enrolled their children 
in private schools where the employment of a racially discriminatory 
admission system was permitted because the schools were not state 
actors for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 Congress 
subsequently passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964.75 Soon thereafter, 
the IRS refused to process exemption applications for segregated 
private schools.76 In 1967, the IRS determined that it would no longer 
grant tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools that 
were sufficiently entangled with the state.77 Private schools that 
lacked such entanglement, however, were still given tax-exempt 
status by the IRS.78  
A group of African-American parents challenged this policy by 
suing the IRS to enjoin it from granting tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory private schools.79 After the district court granted their 
injunction,80 the IRS reviewed each of its previous grants of tax-
exempt status in an effort to revoke the exemption of any private 
schools that discriminated on the basis of race.81 Various private 
schools appealed the district court’s injunction, leading to the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.  
The specific facts giving rise to Bob Jones82 involved a private, 
religious university that refused to admit students who were married 
to or dating someone of a different race. Based upon this policy, the 
                                                     
 73. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 74. See Jerome C. Hafter & Peter M. Hoffman, Note, Segregation 
Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L. J. 1436, 1436-40 (1973); see also James A. 
Davids, Enforcing a Traditional Moral Code Does Not Trigger A Religious 
Institution’s Loss of Tax Exemption, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 435-37 (2012). 
 75. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)). 
 76. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 1129. 
 80. See id. at 1140. 
 81. I.R.S. News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in 7 Standard Fed. Tax 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6,790. 
 82. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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IRS revoked the school’s tax exempt status.83 The university sued, 
arguing that the IRS’s decision violated its right to free exercise of 
religion under the First Amendment.  
2. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Bob Jones 
As it had in Walz, the Court in Bob Jones emphasized the 
social benefits that religious organizations provide to society. The 
Court further emphasized that the legislative history behind section 
170 and section 501(c)(3) demonstrated that Congress wanted to 
provide tax benefits to institutions that served productive purposes.84 
However, unlike in Walz, the Court failed to even mention the role 
that public institutions could have in providing for pluralism and 
diversity. Rather, the Court wholly ascribed Congress’s favorable tax 
treatment of religious institutions to the public benefits these 
organizations provide to society and the community at large.85 
Ultimately, the Court held that religious organizations must 
meet certain public policy requirements to obtain tax-exempt status.86 
Because the tax-exempt status of 501(c)(3) organizations is premised 
on the public benefit they confer on society, the Court reasoned that 
these organizations must comply with public policy to qualify for tax 
benefits.87 In other words, an organization would not be fulfilling its 
                                                     
 83. Earlier, the IRS had publicly announced in a news release that it would 
revoke the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory schools and it had enacted 
Revenue Ruling 71-447.31. Revenue Ruling 71-447 stated: “All charitable trusts, 
educational or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust 
may not be illegal or contrary to public policy.” Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
The IRS based its position on the Restatement of Trusts, which provided: “[a] trust 
for a purpose the accomplishment of which is contrary to public policy, although not 
forbidden by law, is invalid.” Id. 
 84. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 587-88 (“[I]n enacting both § 170 and § 
501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to 
encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose 
or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.”). 
 85. Id. at 591. (“Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the 
exempt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the 
community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and 
advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.”). 
 86. Id. at 586 (“[U]nderlying all relevant parts of the [Tax] Code, is the 
intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law 
standards of charity—namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must 
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.”). 
 87. See id. at 592 (stating that a charitable organization’s “purpose must not 
be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public 
benefit that might otherwise be conferred.”). 
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function of providing a public benefit if it failed to comply with 
public policy.  
The Court justified its conclusion by looking beyond the plain 
language of the statute, finding that the objective behind the law was 
solely to provide benefits to those organizations that served 
“charitable purposes.”88 Further, citing to testimony in the 
congressional record, the Court found that one reason behind section 
501(c)(3)’s enactment was to reward those organizations that 
provided benefits to society.89 Importantly, however, a charitable 
organization only failed the public policy requirement “where there 
[could] be no doubt that the activity involved [was] contrary to a 
fundamental public policy.”90 
After establishing the public-policy requirement in sections 170 
and 501(c)(3), the Court considered whether an “established” public 
policy prohibited racial discrimination, particularly in admissions in 
an educational setting.91 The Court held that such a public policy 
existed based on judicial, legislative, and executive actions 
prohibiting racial discrimination.92 In the judicial arena, the Court 
relied on its ruling in Brown, that the “separate but equal” doctrine93 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.94 Further, in Cooper v. Aaron, 
the Court had broadened this rule, holding that racial segregation 
also violated the Due Process Clause.95 Regarding legislative 
statements, the Court relied on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibited racial discrimination in education, voting, and housing.96 
                                                     
 88. See id. at 586. 
 89. See id. at 587-88 (“[I]n enacting . . . § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to 
provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of 
private institutions that serve a useful purpose or supplement or take the place of 
public institutions of the same kind.”). 
 90. See id. at 592 (emphasis added). 
 91. See id. at 593-95. 
 92. See id. (“Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of 
this Court and myriad acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national 
policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education.”). 
 93. Under this doctrine, separate but equal facilities were upheld as 
constitutional as long as they were substantially equal to each other. See, e.g., 
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 
(1914). 
 94. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593. 
 95. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (“The right of a student not 
to be segregated on racial grounds in schools ... is indeed so fundamental and 
pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.”). 
 96. See Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000c, 2000c-6, 2000d (2012) (prohibiting racial discrimination in education); 
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Regarding executive decisions, the Court highlighted a series of 
executive orders beginning in the 1940s under President Truman, 
which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment.97 The 
Court also noted President Eisenhower’s use of the military to 
desegregate schools nationwide, and that President Kennedy had 
described federal support of racially discriminatory housing policies 
as “inconsistent with . . . public policy.”98  
The Court weighed the government’s interest in eradicating 
racial discrimination in education with the university’s right to 
operate its school in accordance with the free exercise of its religious 
beliefs. The Court held that the government’s interest substantially 
outweighed the burdens imposed on the university by the revocation 
of its tax-exempt status. As such, the university’s free exercise claim 
failed. 
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, sharply diverged 
from the Court’s holding on this point.99 He reasoned that the holding 
injected an element of coercion into the IRS’s determination of tax-
exempt status, potentially forcing organizations to conform to the 
government’s view of “the public interest.”100 Justice Powell would 
have justified tax exemption based on an organization’s contribution 
to a diversification of activities and viewpoints.101 
3. Federal Courts and the Public Policy Doctrine 
Although the Bob Jones Court explained why it violated 
fundamental public policy for a religious organization to 
discriminate on the basis of race, it did not provide any explicit 
                                                                                                                
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012) (prohibiting racial 
discrimination in voting); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 
3601 (2012) (prohibiting racial discrimination in housing). Importantly, this Act 
restricted both private and state government discrimination. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (“In view of the clear legislative intent, 
Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate 
the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 97. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 594 (“Several years before this 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Bd. of Education, . . . President Truman issued 
Executive Orders prohibiting racial discrimination in federal employment decisions, 
Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. § 720 (1943-1948 Comp.).”). 
 98. Id. at 594-95 (quoting Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. § 652 
(1959‒1963)) (prohibiting racial discrimination in housing). 
 99. Id. at 608-09 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. (finding the majority’s holding “troubling” because of its emphasis 
on “conformity”). 
 101. See id. 
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guidance regarding other practices that might violate fundamental 
public policy.102 As a result, the IRS has been hesitant to exercise its 
power to revoke tax exemptions based on public policy grounds, 
exercising that power only in cases of racial discrimination103 and 
illegality.104 Further, since Bob Jones, federal courts have done little 
to clarify the scope of the public policy doctrine. 
In the vast majority of cases in which courts mention the public 
policy doctrine, they do so only to note that it is a requirement for 
obtaining tax-exempt status.105 In fact, even in cases involving 
controversial practices that clearly violate fundamental public policy, 
courts have been hesitant to base their holdings on the public policy 
doctrine. For example, in Mysteryboy Incorporation v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court reviewed the IRS’s denial of tax-
exempt status to Mysteryboy, an organization formed to research 
“the pros and cons of decriminalizing natural consensual sexual 
behaviors between adults and underagers and decriminalizing what is 
defined as child pornography.”106 The IRS had denied Mysteryboy’s 
application for tax-exempt status on the basis that its purpose 
                                                     
 102. See id. at 592 (majority opinion). 
 103. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (announcing that “a school not 
having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within 
the common law concepts reflected in section 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code and in 
other relevant Federal statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization 
exempt from Federal income tax.”). In fact, the IRS now even requires not only that 
private schools adopt such a policy, Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834, but also that 
they publicize it and show evidence that they operate under such a policy. Rev. Proc. 
75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. 
 104. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991) (revoking 
tax-exempt status of hospital that violated the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud 
and Abuse Law); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (May 20, 2013) (revoking tax-
exempt status of cooperative for the sale of marijuana in violation of federal law). 
 105. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315 
(1987) (“Because we may affirm the Tax Court on this ground, we do not reach the 
questions of whether the Church operated for a substantial commercial purpose or 
whether it violated public policy.”); Educ. Assistance Found. for Descendants of 
Hungarian Immigrants in Performing Arts, Inc. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 3d 34, 
39 (D.D.C. 2015) (“While not applicable in this case, the Court also notes that ‘[a]n 
organization that otherwise meets the statutory requirements will nevertheless fail to 
qualify for tax-exempt status if its exemption-related activities violate public 
policy.”); United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 326, 382 (1997), rev’d, 
165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in addition to other requirements for 
tax-exempt status, the purpose of the organization “must not be ‘contrary to a 
fundamental public policy.’”); Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485 (1997) (same). 
 106. T.C. Memo. 2010-13. 
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violated fundamental public policy.107 Instead of affirming the denial 
on those same grounds, however, the Tax Court based its decision to 
uphold the IRS’s holding on the fact that Mysteryboy was not 
organized and did not operate for permissible purposes.108 
This shows that federal courts have been particularly hesitant to 
apply, much less extend, the public policy doctrine to areas outside 
of racial discrimination, even when extending the doctrine to those 
areas would be relatively uncontroversial. While Bob Jones is a 
seminal case whose holding has potential for a wide-ranging 
application to other areas of law, its holding has been mostly 
confined to the particular circumstances it dealt with, namely racial 
discrimination in education. Because of its effectiveness as a tool to 
silence institutional dissent, however, the potential of the extension 
of the Bob Jones doctrine to other areas always loom large in the 
background of debates regarding contentious social issues. One of 
these is the continuing debate about same-sex marriage. 
IV. SEXUAL-ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION AND THE PUBLIC-
POLICY LIMITATION ON THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS. 
Although many scholars welcomed the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Obergefell,109 others feared that the many questions left 
unanswered by the Court could lead to severe repercussions for 
religious liberty.110 The most pressing question involves whether 
religious organizations’ advocating and acting on beliefs arguably 
contrary to Obergefell violates public policy such that the Treasury 
Department and the IRS can revoke the tax-exempt status of these 
organizations. Several reasons exist for the Supreme Court to refuse 
to extend the public policy doctrine to same-sex rights and cabin the 
doctrine to issues that all three branches of government have 
attempted to address through a decades-long, concerted effort. First, 
                                                     
 107. Id. 
 108. Mysteryboy Incorporation v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057 (2010). 
 109. See Maureen Truax Holland, Equal Justice for Same-Sex Married 
Couples: Reflections by a Tennessee Lawyer Who Helped Achieve National 
Marriage Equality, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 175, 176 (2015); Jack B. Harrison, At Long 
Last Marriage, 24 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015). 
 110. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be in 
question if they opposed same-sex marriage. . . . Unfortunately, people of faith can 
take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.”); Lauter, 
supra note 7; Burk, supra note 7.  
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this interpretation is supported by the disharmonious positions of the 
three branches of government on same-sex rights. Second, this 
interpretation is supported by the Bob Jones Court’s holding and 
subsequent interpretation of that decision by federal courts. Third, 
this approach conforms with the Supreme Court’s historic 
justification for tax exemptions, namely to promote a diversity of 
beliefs in both the religious and public spheres. 
A. The Disharmonious Positions of the Three Branches of 
Government on Same-Sex Rights Support a Narrow 
Interpretation of the Public Policy Doctrine 
In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court never explicitly held that a 
decades-long, concerted effort by all three branches of government 
was a necessary condition to establish fundamental public policy.111 
The Supreme Court did hold, however, that this was a sufficient 
condition.112 Accordingly, the starting point to any inquiry into 
whether fundamental public policy exists with regard to a particular 
issue involves an analysis of the actions taken by the three branches 
on government with regard to that issue. 
1. The Judiciary’s Pronouncements 
In Bob Jones, the Court pointed to “[a]n unbroken line” of 
eight Supreme Court cases to support its holding that racial 
discrimination in education violated national public policy.113 To 
analyze whether the judiciary’s determinations support holding that 
sexual orientation discrimination violates fundamental public policy, 
the Court would likely consider several cases.  
a. Supreme Court Cases Pre-Obergefell 
The search for a line of cases holding that sexual-orientation 
discrimination violates public policy would have to start after the 
Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.114 There, the Court 
upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy.115 The Court held 
                                                     
 111. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1983).  
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. at 593. 
 114. 478 U.S. 186, 187-89 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003). 
 115. See id. at 191-92. 
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that no fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy existed.116 
Instead of such a right being rooted in the history and traditions of 
the nation, the Bowers Court found that since the nation’s founding, 
both common law and the states largely criminalized sodomy.117 
In Romer v. Evans, the Court reversed course, striking down a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited state and local 
governments from enacting legislation protecting homosexuals.118 
However, the Court refused to find that homosexuals were a 
protected class or that homosexual conduct was a fundamental 
right.119 Rather, the Court invalidated the amendment under rational-
basis review, finding that animus against a group of people was not a 
legitimate state interest.120     
In addition to Romer’s failure to recognize a fundamental right 
to homosexual conduct, it did not initiate an “unbroken line of 
cases.” Subsequently, the Court sustained policies of sexual-
orientation discrimination by private organizations in two cases. In 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group121 and 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,122 the Court held that the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association protected the 
decisions of private groups to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation.123 As such, the respective state anti-discrimination 
statutes that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation 
could not be enforced against those groups.124 
The only case that potentially initiated a line of judicial 
pronouncements prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination is 
Lawrence v. Texas.125 There, the Court overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick, holding that the Constitution prohibits a state from 
criminalizing consensual sodomy.126 The Court found that the 
Constitution provided for a fundamental right to engage in intimate 
                                                     
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. 517 U.S. 620, 624-25 (1996). 
 119. See id. at 625-26, 635-36; see also id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
 121. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 122. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 123. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580-81; Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 
644, 661. 
 124. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580-81; Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 
644, 661. 
 125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 126. Id. 
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consensual sodomy.127 However, the Court once again refused to find 
that homosexuals were a protected class or that there was a 
fundamental right to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.128 Instead, the Court applied rational-basis review, 
finding that traditional sexual morality is not a legitimate interest 
justifying an anti-sodomy state statute.129 Thus, while Lawrence is 
undoubtedly a favorable decision for same-sex rights, it fails to 
qualify as a judicial pronouncement establishing that sexual-
orientation discrimination violates fundamental public policy 
because it fails to even hold that homosexuality or homosexual acts 
are protected as fundamental rights. 
Prior to Obergefell, no unbroken line of cases exists that 
collectively prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination. In fact, until 
2013, most states still denied the fundamental right to marry to same-
sex couples. Obergefell therefore provided a key opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to elaborate on this issue. 
b. Obergefell v. Hodges 
Obergefell presented two questions for the Supreme Court: (1) 
whether “the Fourteenth Amendment require[s] a state to license a 
marriage between two people of the same sex,” and (2) whether “the 
Fourteenth Amendment require[s] a state to recognize a same-sex 
marriage lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state.”130 The Court 
framed the issue as whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
the fundamental right of marriage was sufficiently justified by a state 
interest. Ultimately, the Court held that same-sex couples have a 
fundamental right to marry, and that states may not define marriage 
so as to exclude same-sex couples.131  
The Court based its decision primarily on the view that 
marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be denied to same-sex 
                                                     
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]owhere does the Court’s 
opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due 
Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that 
would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a ‘fundamental 
right.’”). 
 129. See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 
2004) (finding that the Lawrence Court used rational basis review); Arizona v. 
Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the Lawrence Court 
applied rational basis review). 
 130. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015). 
 131. Id. at 2607-08. 
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couples because no justifiable basis for such denial exists.132 As its 
basic premise, the Court held that the Due Process Clause protected 
certain fundamental liberties beyond those enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights.133 The Court found that the judiciary’s role was to consider 
history and tradition for guidance in identifying these rights, and to 
use “reasoned judgment” to ensure that these rights were protected 
by the states.134   
The Court found guidance for identifying a fundamental right 
to marriage in its precedents. Most significantly, the Court discussed 
Loving v. Virginia, which held that the right to marriage could not be 
denied to interracial couples.135 The Court further supported its 
holding that marriage is a fundamental right by pointing to Turner v. 
Shafley, which held that prisoners could not be denied the right to 
marry.136 Lastly, the Court mentioned Zablocki v. Redhail, which 
held that the right to marry could not be denied to fathers who were 
behind on child support payments.137 
Although the Court acknowledged that these decisions were 
limited to establishing the right of opposite-sex couples to marry, it 
cited Lawrence v. Texas for the proposition that same-sex couples 
had the same right as opposite-sex couples to engage in intimate 
association.138 The Court elaborated on four principles that it viewed 
as further supporting its holding that marriage as a fundamental right 
has equal significance for same-sex couples.139 The Court found that 
for both categories of couples, marriage expressed (1) a personal 
choice in intimate association through which an individual could 
shape one’s identity and find security, safety, and connection; (2) an 
association involving a union expressing commitment and intimacy 
through which couples could dignify themselves by defining their 
mutual commitment; (3) a legal structure which safeguarded families 
and children by providing structure, permanency, and stability for 
family life; and (4) a foundation of the social order.140 Additionally, 
the Court noted the legal characteristics of marriage, including 
                                                     
 132. Id. at 2604-05. 
 133. Id. at 2597 (“In addition these liberties extend to certain personal 
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define a person’s identity and beliefs.”).  
 134. Id. at 2589. 
 135. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 136. Turner v. Shafley, 782 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987). 
 137. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). 
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 139. See id. at 2600-03. 
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taxation, insurance, medical decision-making, inheritance, child 
custody, support, and visitation.141 Based on these principles, the 
Court concluded that no material differences existed between same-
sex and opposite-sex couples with regard to the meaning and 
importance placed on marriage. Accordingly, same-sex couples, just 
like opposite-sex couples, had a fundamental right to marriage.142 
Significantly, the Court found that procreation was not a 
significant aspect of marriage.143 The Court alluded to its precedent 
protecting the right to contraception and abortion as supporting the 
proposition that procreation was not essential to marriage.144 
Additionally, the Court noted that sterile individuals and women past 
child-bearing age may marry.145 Because of this, the Court saw 
procreation as only one of the incidents of marriage.146  
Central to the Court’s holding was the historical change in 
national attitudes toward homosexuality. The Court noted that while 
homosexuality had formerly been seen as immoral, and even 
criminal, it was now viewed as “both a normal expression of human 
sexuality and immutable.”147 The Court traced a similar evolution of 
the status of homosexuals under the Constitution.148 Although at first 
the Court upheld state laws criminalizing sodomy in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,149 the Court overruled this decision a decade later in 
Romer v. Evans, holding that a state could not prevent the enactment 
of laws protecting gays and lesbians.150 Further, in Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court held that state laws criminalizing sodomy were 
unconstitutional.151 
The Court noted a similar trend in the interpretation of state 
constitutions by state courts. It identified Baehr v. Lewin, in which 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a state’s restricting marriage 
                                                     
 141. See id. at 2601. 
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 149. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
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to opposite-sex couples was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, as the earliest state court decision addressing 
same-sex marriage.152 Then, in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Court became the first state 
supreme court to recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry.153  
The Court acknowledged that on the federal level, Congress 
passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as a reaction to the 
efforts to redefine marriage to include same-sex couples.154 It 
emphasized, however, that it had invalidated that part of DOMA in 
Windsor v. United States. In that case, the Court held that DOMA 
“impermissibly disparaged those same-sex couples ‘who wanted to 
affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their 
family, their friends, and their community.’”155  
The Court also analyzed the questions presented before it under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.156 
Importantly, the Court did not conduct a traditional equal protection 
analysis by defining homosexuals as a protected class or specifying 
characteristics that would justify a heightened level of scrutiny of 
laws that infringed their rights.157 Rather, the Court focused on the 
interconnectivity of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause, which it viewed as strengthening the claim to fundamental 
liberties.158 Further, while the violation of equal protection occurred 
primarily in gays and lesbians being denied equal access to the 
benefits of marriage, this denial was inextricably related to the denial 
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of the right to marriage itself.159 From these principles, the Court 
concluded that:  
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the 
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of 
that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may 
exercise the fundamental right to marry.160 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell fails to establish 
the judiciary’s recognition for a fundamental public policy 
prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination. In Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court utilized an analysis similar to that employed by the 
Lawrence Court. As in Lawrence, where the Court held that no 
justifiable basis exists for prohibiting same-sex intimate conduct, the 
Obergefell Court held that no justifiable basis exists for denying 
marriage to same-sex couples.161 As in Lawrence, the Court failed to 
designate homosexuals as a protected class or hold that homosexual 
conduct was a fundamental right. Rather, the Court held that same-
sex couples had a right to engage in the fundamental right to marry 
based on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.162 
Most importantly, however, the Court itself acknowledged that:  
[R]eligions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to 
advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-
sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that 
religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they 
seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their 
lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family 
structure they have long revered.163 
This shows that the Court recognized that others, particularly 
religious groups, could continue to advocate contrary to the Court’s 
opinion. Unlike in Bob Jones, where the Court recognized the 
eradication of racial discrimination in education as a compelling 
government interest that trumped even religious beliefs, the 
Obergefell Court explicitly allowed for the promotion of religious 
beliefs contrary to the Court’s opinion. As such, Obergefell fails to 
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establish that prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination is a 
compelling government interest, much less fundamental policy.  
Based on the forgoing analysis of case law, it is clear that a line 
of Supreme Court cases exists on the rights of same-sex couples, 
culminating in the establishment of the recognition of the right to 
same-sex marriage in Obergefell. In Bob Jones, after examining its 
own precedent, the Supreme Court then turned to congressional 
views on the issue.164 As discussed below, fewer legislative 
pronouncements supporting same-sex rights exist than judicial 
pronouncements. 
2. Legislative Pronouncements 
The congressional record also fails to reflect support for a 
fundamental public policy prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination. Until recently, Congress has done little to protect 
against sexual-orientation discrimination. For example, Congress has 
never added sexual orientation to the list of prohibited categories of 
employment discrimination. Such protections from discrimination on 
the basis of race, gender, age, and disability have existed for over 
forty years.165 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”), 
which would have added sexual-orientation discrimination to the list 
of prohibited discrimination by employers, has repeatedly failed to 
pass Congress.166 
In fact, several instances exist where Congress blocked efforts 
by other branches to protect against sexual orientation 
discrimination.167 Congress opposed President Clinton’s efforts to 
allow gays to serve openly in the military, which ended in the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” compromise that President Clinton signed into 
law.168 Congress overrode the District of Columbia’s Domestic 
Partners Act, which would have provided benefits to couples living 
together.169 Further, in response to the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court’s holding that Georgetown University was required to allow a 
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homosexual student organization, Congress passed the Nation’s 
Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, which 
permitted religious educational institutions to deny recognition to 
groups based on sexual orientation.170 
In 1994, Congress provided tacit support for ending violence 
based on sexual orientation when it designated crimes against people 
based on their sexual orientation as a “hate crime” under the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.171 Soon after, 
however, Congress enacted, and President Clinton signed, the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),172 which defined marriage as 
between one man and one woman for purposes of federal law.173 
Although the Supreme Court held DOMA unconstitutional in 2013, 
its enactment demonstrates a lack of support in the congressional 
record for a fundamental public policy in support of prohibiting 
sexual-orientation discrimination. 
During the Bush (41) administration, Congress showed little 
support for legislative initiatives targeting sexual orientation 
discrimination. Bills repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and DOMA 
failed to gain traction.174 Further, ENDA failed to pass both houses of 
Congress,175 and Congress failed to enact the Mathew Shepard Local 
Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act.176  
During the first two years after President Obama was elected, 
Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress provided ample 
support for legislation aimed at protecting homosexual rights. 
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Congress repealed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy177 and enacted 
the Mathew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act.178 The 2010 elections, however, significantly 
changed the party composition in Congress,179 and bills aimed at 
protecting homosexual rights have failed to proceed in Congress 
during the remainder of President Obama’s tenure. As such, in its 
current state, the congressional intent to prohibit sexual-orientation 
discrimination by private actors, including religious organizations, is 
dubious at best. 
3. Executive Pronouncements 
Finally, the Executive Branch’s record on same-sex issues fails 
to provide support for a fundamental public policy prohibiting sexual 
orientation. At best, that record is mixed. The Executive Branch only 
started supporting same-sex rights under President Clinton, and since 
then its actions on same-sex rights have largely depended on the 
ideological leaning of the president. 
President Clinton signed three executive orders relating to 
sexual-orientation discrimination.180 In 1995, he prohibited agencies 
from considering sexual orientation in deciding a person’s eligibility 
to access confidential information.181 In 1998, he enacted an 
executive order prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in 
federal employment.182 Finally, in 2000, he enacted an executive 
order prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in education and 
training programs and activities.183 In addition to these executive 
orders, President Clinton advanced homosexual rights by supporting 
the failed ENDA bill, appointing homosexuals to federal offices, and 
recognizing June as the Gay and Lesbian Month.184  
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Although President Bush chose not to rescind any of President 
Clinton’s executive pronouncements, he shifted course in several 
ways.185 Bush refused to enact any executive orders protecting 
homosexuals. He supported passage of the Federal Marriage 
Amendment, the ratification of which would have prevented federal 
courts from recognizing a right to same-sex marriage.186 Further, he 
opposed the enactment of laws that would have classified a crime 
committed because of the sexual orientation of the victim as a “hate 
crime,” even threatening to veto them if passed by Congress.187   
President Obama, however, resumed the Executive Branch’s 
support for homosexual rights. Most importantly, he amended 
Executive Order 11246, which prohibited federal contractors from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.188 He also appointed 
numerous openly gay individuals to federal positions.189 He also 
supported passage of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 
and the Mathew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, which he ultimately signed into law.190 President 
Obama also supported the repeal of DOMA191 as well as the 
enactment of ENDA192 and the Domestic Partnership Benefits and 
Obligations Act.193 
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For opposition to same-sex marriage to violate fundamental 
public policy, each branch of government would have to recognize 
that the eradication of such opposition is a compelling government 
interest. Currently, post-Obergefell, however, all branches of 
government, have never held that homosexuals are a protected or 
even semi-protected class or that the eradication of sexual-
orientation discrimination is a compelling government interest.194 
Rather, the records of the judicial, congressional, and executive 
branches on same-sex rights is mixed, with the branches of 
government supporting same-sex rights at times, but opposing those 
rights in other instances.     
Thus, while public opinion, case law,195 and government 
institutions’ pronouncements may be trending toward establishing a 
federal public policy against sexual-orientation discrimination,196 
there is currently no such policy.197 And no such policy can emerge 
until all three government branches engage in a decades-long, 
concerted effort to eradicate sexual orientation discrimination. As 
such, sexual orientation discrimination does not violate fundamental 
public policy for purposes of granting tax-exempt status to religious 
organizations that oppose same-sex marriage. 
 
                                                                                                                
Stuart J. Ishimaru, Acting Chairman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
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B. Bob Jones and its Progeny Support a Narrow Interpretation of 
the Public Policy Doctrine 
As discussed above, Section 501 of Title 26 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which provides for the regulation of religious tax 
exemptions, does not prohibit discrimination by religious 
organizations.198 The only possible restriction on the ability of tax-
exempt religious organizations to oppose same-sex marriage 
therefore lies in the public policy doctrine enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University.199 And several reasons, 
explicit both in the Bob Jones opinion and its context, support a 
narrow interpretation of the Court’s holding in that case. First, the 
Bob Jones Court’s use of limiting language in articulating the public 
policy doctrine, and lower courts’ hesitancy to apply the doctrine 
supports a narrow interpretation of the doctrine. Second, the unique 
context of the Bob Jones case itself, namely the decades-long fight to 
eradicate institutional racial discrimination, suggest that its holding 
was narrowly tailored to remedy that problem. 
1. Bob Jones’ Limiting Language and its Outlier Status 
The Bob Jones Court never clearly defined what constituted 
“established public policy,” or even what sources of law and policy 
the IRS should consider in determining whether an established public 
policy exists on an issue.200 That is why Chief Justice Roberts (in his 
dissent in Obergefell)201―and Justice Alito (during oral arguments in 
that case)202 wondered what implications the Court’s opinion ruling 
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in favor of same-sex marriage would have for the tax-exempt status 
of religious organizations that opposed the decision. Although Bob 
Jones provides some guidance as to what constitutes “established 
public policy” in the context of illegality and racial discrimination, it 
fails to provide a clearly delineated process for revoking the tax-
exempt status of religious organizations outside of that context. Most 
likely as a result of the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity, the IRS itself 
has never clarified the contours of the public policy doctrine either.203 
Instead, the IRS has relied heavily on constitutional law principles in 
formulating the public policy doctrine.204 
Despite its lack of clarity, the Supreme Court’s language in 
Bob Jones indicates that its holding was a narrow one. Organizations 
could only lose their tax-exempt status “where there can be no doubt 
that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public 
policy.”205 The Court reached its holding only after determining that 
“[a]n unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education 
establishe[d] beyond doubt . . . that racial discrimination in education 
violates a most fundamental national public policy,”206 a position 
shared by both Congress and the executive branch.207 Additionally, 
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the Court specifically limited its holding, emphasizing that it “deal[s] 
only with religious schools―not with churches or other purely 
religious institutions.”208 This shows that the Bob Jones Court 
recognized that it was addressing a very specific problem in 
rendering its decision―racial discrimination in education. 
Because of its narrow holding and unique context, Bob Jones 
has been labeled an outlier.209 Although the public policy requirement 
is alive and well, it has rarely been cited for the proposition that 
religious organizations must comply with established public 
policy.210 Bob Jones has been cited over 350 times in published 
opinions,211 but only a small minority of these opinions reference it in 
applying the public policy requirement to religious organizations.212 
Instead, Bob Jones is most commonly cited for the proposition that 
when engaging in statutory interpretation, courts should look beyond 
the legislative text to comply with Congress’s legislative intent.213 
The Court’s enunciation of the public policy doctrine in Bob 
Jones should be construed narrowly because it represents an outlier 
interpretation of the public policy doctrine.214 Although the contours 
of the doctrine are unclear, Bob Jones explicitly held that its decision 
was restricted to a narrow set of circumstances: racial discrimination 
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in education.215 Federal courts and the IRS itself have adhered to this 
interpretation by refusing to apply the public policy doctrine outside 
of the context of racial discrimination and illegality.216 Further, the 
problem addressed by Bob Jones―racial discrimination in 
education―has a unique nature that suggests the doctrine cannot 
easily be applied to other contexts. 
2. The Unique Problem Addressed by Bob Jones  
The context of Bob Jones supports the argument that the 
Supreme Court’s holding largely stems from the unique 
circumstances it was dealing with in that case.217 To date, the only 
organizations that have lost their tax-exempt status under the public 
policy doctrine are organizations that discriminated on the basis of 
race, advocated for civil disobedience, or engaged in blatantly illegal 
activity.218  
In Bob Jones, the Court addressed a problem of historic 
proportions. It is undisputed that racial discrimination occupies a 
uniquely invidious position in our nation’s history.219 In fact, 
Presidents have used military force to eliminate racial 
discrimination.220 Further, with regard to racial discrimination in 
education specifically, schools across the South remained segregated 
for decades after the Court’s Brown v. Board of Education221 
decision.222 After government-enforced desegregation of public 
schools, white parents left these schools for private schools to 
continue segregated education.223 Many of these schools were 
affiliated with Protestant churches, which allowed them to benefit 
from tax-exempt status as well.224 It was against this background that 
the Bob Jones Court granted certiorari to decide whether private, 
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religious schools could have tax-exempt status while simultaneously 
discriminating based on race.225 
Undoubtedly, several courts have drawn parallels between 
racial discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination. For 
example, in Goodridge v. Department of Health, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court equated racial discrimination with sexual-orientation 
discrimination.226 Importantly, however, the Goodridge court failed 
to go as far as the Bob Jones Court and state that it was the 
government’s responsibility to eradicate sexual orientation 
discrimination even at the price of substantially burdening religious 
exercise.227 This is because government has pursued, and still does 
pursue, the eradication of racial discrimination with a singular 
purpose, but has not engaged in the same practice with regard to 
sexual-orientation discrimination.228 
Additionally, while several scholars have supported the 
analogy between racial discrimination and sexual-orientation 
discrimination,229 others have been careful to point out the 
differences.230 Both sides agree, however, that if the Supreme Court 
were to hold that the eradication of sexual-orientation discrimination 
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is a fundamental public policy, religious objectors would receive 
only the narrowest accommodations, if any at all.231 And this would 
run counter to the historic justification for the government’s grant of 
tax-exempt status to religious organizations, which is to promote a 
diversity of religious beliefs and provide for a pluralistic society.232 
C. The Supreme Court’s Historic Justification for Tax Exemptions 
Supports a Narrow Interpretation of the Public Policy Doctrine 
Historically, the Supreme Court has justified granting tax-
exempt status to religious organizations because of the diversity and 
pluralism of beliefs these institutions provide.233 A narrow 
interpretation of the public policy doctrine will strengthen this 
justification by allowing religious organizations to contribute to 
diversity of thought in cases when this is most important, such as 
expressing dissent from unjust or unfair government policies. This 
would prevent the public policy doctrine from morphing into a 
cudgel with which the government could force belief systems to 
conform to its dictates.234 Extending the Bob Jones holding to other 
areas of public policy opens up potential for the misuse of the public 
policy doctrine, threatening the character and spirit of charities in the 
United States.235 
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York236 is the seminal case in 
which the Supreme Court laid out the constitutional justification for 
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tax exemption of religious organizations.237 Importantly, the Court 
held that tax exemptions for religious organizations are justified 
based on the fact that religious organizations encourage and provide 
a diversity of belief systems and pluralism of thought throughout the 
nation.238 The Court recognized the additional valuable social 
benefits provided by religious organizations,239 but ultimately 
expressly held that the provision of social benefits alone is an 
insufficient justification for tax exemption because of the variety, 
nature, and scope of social services that religious organizations 
provide.240  
The Supreme Court’s justification for granting tax-exempt 
status to organizations is evident in practice. A search of the IRS’s 
Exempt Organization Select Check Database reveals that a diversity 
of organizations enjoy tax-exempt status.241 Thousands of 
organizations are present on this list, ranging from the National Right 
to Life Committee to Planned Parenthood, the National Organization 
for Women to the National Center for Men, Atheists United and the 
Muslim Foundation.242 The government’s decision to provide tax-
exempt status to organizations promoting religious, social, and 
political views has thus undoubtedly contributed to the expression of 
a diversity of views and a pluralistic society.  
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Although Bob Jones rests heavily on the fact that religious 
organizations that discriminate on the basis of education fail to 
provide social benefits, this rationale is limited to its context in racial 
discrimination. This nation’s unique struggle with racial 
discrimination in education shows that any social benefits provided 
by racially discriminatory private schools are outweighed by the 
harms caused by racially discriminatory admissions systems.  
In the context of religious organizations’ opposition to same-
sex marriage, however, the calculus is different. Religious 
organizations’ adherence to sincere beliefs regarding the sanctity of 
traditional marriage represents an important contribution to diversity 
of religious beliefs and to a pluralistic society. Nondiscrimination 
statutes are based on the premise that discrimination occurs because 
of animus.243 For dominant religions in the United States, however, 
opposition to same-sex marriage does not stem from animus, but 
from the sincere belief that marriage represents a religious 
sacrament244 or a distinct religious covenant between God and 
believers.245  
Unlike racial discrimination, opposition to same-sex marriage 
for many religious organizations is not simply a selfish goal. In fact, 
most religious institutions readily provide services to homosexuals in 
a variety of ways and only object to directly facilitating same-sex 
marriage.246 This is because, for many religious institutions, 
participating in a marriage is not simply a service, but an expression 
of faith and a profession of devotion to God.247  
Extending the public policy doctrine to include a prohibition on 
opposing same-sex marriage will force religious organizations to 
face tremendous penalties. For many religious organizations, loss of 
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tax-exempt status would be a staggering financial loss.248 Further, the 
possibility of the loss of tax-exempt status will erode traditional 
deference to religious institutions, threatening them with litigation.249 
This would further increase financial losses for religious 
organizations.250 And the IRS, in many cases, would not even need to 
take overt action. The mere potential of losing tax-exempt status 
would be sufficient to ensure that many religious institutions 
conform to government dictates.251 This day is not yet here, and it 
shouldn’t be, because the lack of clear agreement by all three 
branches of governments on same-sex rights fails to establish a 
fundamental public policy prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination.  
CONCLUSION 
Although Obergefell itself said nothing about taxes, its ruling 
holds tremendous potential in the area of tax exemptions for 
religious organizations. On both sides of the same-sex marriage 
issue, scholars saw the opportunity that the public-policy doctrine 
articulated in Bob Jones provides for silencing institutional dissent. 
And while it is same-sex marriage today, it will be an issue of an 
entirely different character tomorrow. Thus, because of the potential 
for its misuse as a tool to bring about conformity to government 
dictates, a broad interpretation of the public-policy doctrine runs 
directly counter to the very purpose of tax exemptions, that of 
providing for an institutional diversity of beliefs. The Supreme Court 
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should therefore use this opportunity to clarify the doctrine, by 
narrowing its interpretation to issues where the three branches of 
government have adopted a decades-long, concerted effort to remedy 
a societal ill and refusing to extend its application to same-sex rights. 
